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*Resident  Scholar,  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College For  the  most  part,  since  its inception  in  1938,  the  minimum  wage  has  hovered  around  55 
percent  of  average  annual  hourly  wages  for  production  and  nonsupervisory  workers.  Between 
198 1 and  1989,  the  minimum  wage  fell  below  40 percent  and  it again  fell  below  40 percent 
between  1990-1996.  For  some,  the  failure  of  the  minimum  wage  to keep  pace  with  inflation  is a 
matter  of deliberate  government  policy  aimed  at creating  a low-wage  economy  (Piore,  1995; 
Prasch,  1996).  For  others  -- mainly  the  mainstream  of  the  economics  profession  -- the  fact  that 
the  minimum  wage  was  not  increased  is really  a testament  to the  soundness  of  economic  analysis 
that  holds  minimum  wage  increases  to be detrimental  to the  economy  as a whole.  Both 
perspectives,  however,  may  be problematic.  The  first  assumes  that  government  may  be a 
monolithic  structure  and  as such  can  easily  reach  a unitary  decision.  Government  is not.  Rather  it 
is -- at least  in the  U.S.  -- a collection  of institutions,  actors  and  processes  that  occasionally 
achieve  some  coherence  on  the  basis  of consensus.  More  often  than  not,  however,  different  actors 
in different  institutions  follow  their  own  respective  agendas.  And  the  second  is problematic 
because  it assumes  that  economic  models  alone  drive  the policy  process.  They  simply  do  not. 
Rather  policy  is a function  of  a mix  of variables  and  are highly  contingent  on  the  various  interests 
and  actors  involved  (Kingdon,  1984;  Stone,  1988).  It is more  the  case  that  interests  will  rely  on 
economic  models  when  they  serve  to buttress  their  arguments. 
In this  paper  I intend  to argue  that  the  minimum  wage,  as much  as it is a serious  economic 
issue,  is above  all else  a political  one.  The  minimum  wage  is a political  issue  on  several  levels.  On 
one  level,  there  are  the  politics  surrounding  the  choice  of  models.  On  another  level,  there  are the 
1 political  interests  of those  who  engage  in the  debate.  Unlike  entitlement  programs,  the  minimum 
wage  is not  indexed  to inflation.  Rather  it requires  an act of Congress.  Congress,  however,  is 
comprised  of  members  whose  primary  obligation  is to serve  the  constituents  of their  respective 
districts  (Mayhew,  1974;  Kau,  Keen  & Rubin,  1982).  If it isn’t  in  the  interest  of  their  district  -- 
and  regardless  of party  position  -- members  will  vote  against  increasing  the  minimum  wage. 
Another  way  to state  this  is to  say  that  even  if a member’s  party  favors  an increase  in the 
minimum  wage,  that  member  may  still  be inclined  to vote  against  it if his/her  constituency 
interest  in not  raising  it. 
has  an 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is to look  at a variety  of  political  issues  surrounding  the 
minimum  wage.  I specifically  examine  how  the politics  in the choice  of methodological  models 
can  lead  to different  ideological  positions  which  ultimately  will  get  played  out  in the  political 
arena.  To  this  end,  I organize  the  paper  as follows:  I first  examine  the  debate  between  two  models 
-- “demand  constrained”  vs. “supply  constrained”  -- and  the  ideological  implications  that  flow 
from  each.  From  there  I explore  why  it is that  one  particular  model  has  become  the  political  focus 
of  the  debate  at the  expense  of  others.  What  I hope  to  show  is that  because  conclusive  data  on  the 
minimum  wage  has  been  so lacking  the  issue  has  been  ripe  for  political  manipulation.  Nowhere  do 
the  politics  of minimum  wage  show  themselves  to be of greater  importance  than  in those  regions 
of  the  country  with  “right-to-work”  laws.  The  final  section  of  the  paper,  then,  looks  at the  voting 
patterns  of  members  of  Congress.  It is no  secret  that  Democrats  have  traditionally  favored 
minimum  wage  increases  while  Republicans  have  opposed  them.  The  focus  of  this  paper  is on  the 
exceptions.  What  I intend  to  show  is that  Democratic  members  of Congress,  when  they  come 
from  “right-to-work”  states,  tend  to vote  against  minimum  wage  increases  even  though 
2 Democrats  traditionally  favor  it. Similarly,  Republican  members,  when  they  come  from  those 
states  with  higher  union  density,  tend  to vote  for  minimum  wage  increases  even  though 
Republicans  traditionally  oppose  it. This  isn’t  to say that  traditional  economics  models  won’t  have 
a bearing.  Indeed  they  may,  particularly  in the  absence  of  strong  constituent  interest  one  way  or 
the  other.  On  the  whole,  though,  members  listen  to their  constituents.  What  I would  like  to 
suggest,  then,  is that  given  the  fact  that  empirical  data  on  the  effects  of  the  minimum  wage  has 
been  ambiguous  at best  -- a fact  that  in and  of  itself  makes  the choice  of  models  political  with 
regards  to implications  -- it is more  likely  that  minimum  wage  increases  will  occur  when  there  is 
strong  political  support  for  them.  Or more  to the  point,  minimum  wage  increases  are more  likely 
to occur  when  strong  political  arguments  can  be made  on their  behalf. 
Competing  Models 
Politics,  as Harold  Laswell  stated  so long  ago,  is about  who  gets  what,  when  and  where 
(Laswell,  1936).  Stated  in  terms  of the  minimum  wage,  it is about  who  benefits  from  a minimum 
wage  increase  and  who  bears  the  costs.  The  economics  literature  is replete  with  studies 
demonstrating  the  ill effects  of  the  minimum  wage  on  a particular  segment  of  the  labor  market. 
And  while  these  studies  are predicated  on  a particular  model,  the  fact  that  this  particular  focus  has 
been  taken  ultimately  says  more  about  politics  than  the  merits  of  the  model  per  se. Data  on  the 
effects  of the  minimum  wage  is simply  inconclusive  (Leviton  & Belous,  1979;  Brown,  1988).  The 
traditional  neo-classical  economics  model  is a standard  textbook  analysis  which  holds  the  costs  to 
society  of raising  wages  to be  far greater  than  any  benefits.  As the  cost  of  labor  is increased  the 
demand  for  labor  decreases.  Only  if the  demand  for  goods  and  services  on  the  part  of consumers 
3 is increased  can  it be expected  that  there  will  be an increased  demand  for  labor  that  will  effectively 
bid  up  wages.  A policy  which  artificially  raises  wages  to help  some  at the  expense  of others  is 
simply  inefficient.  Even  if there  is some  outward  appearance  of  benefit  to be derived  from  an 
increase  in the  wage  floor,  there  will  invariably  be a cost  to be borne  whether  in  the  form  of job 
loss,  lost  opportunity  for jobs,  lost  benefits  or increased  output  per  man  hours  -- the  demand  for 
higher  productivity. 
This,  of  course,  is a theoretical  construct  which  hasn’t  conclusively  been  proven  in the  real 
world.  On  the  contrary,  in the real  world,  the  minimum  wage  is likely  to affect  different  people 
differently.  Therefore,  the  debate  over  it is ultimately  about  politics  and  ideology.  On  one  level, 
the  nature  of  the  debate  has  been  shaped  by  the  dearth  of empirical  literature  that  could 
demonstrate  categorically  that  increases  in the  minimum  wage  would  have  the  predicted  textbook 
effect.  On  another  level,  it has  been  shaped  by a fundamental  difference  between  two  models,  both 
of which  carry  their  own  serious  respective  repercussions.  One  model  which  is “Demand 
constrained”  assumes  the  minimum  wage  to have  its primary  impact  on  the  behavior  of employers 
and  their  subsequent  demand  for  labor.  The  minimum  wage  leads  to lower  levels  of  employment 
because  it constrains  the  demand  for  labor.  The  other  model  which  is “Supply  constrained” 
assumes  that  the  level  of the  wage  affects  the  supply  of  labor  into  the  market.  The  higher  the 
minimum  wage,  the  more  likely  it is to attract  individuals  into  the labor  market.  Although  both 
models  may  have  validity  in theory,  which  in turn  would  imply  the  need  for public  policy  to  strike 
a balance  between  the  two,  the  problem  thus  far has  been  data.  Considerable  data  exists  to 
suggest  that  the  demand  constrained  model  holds  true,  at least  among  teenagers.  But  there  isn’t 
any  data  to suggest  that  the  supply  constrained  model  holds,  that  it could  be the  basis  upon  which 
4 poverty  is alleviated.  And  yet,  those  who  argue  the  supply  constrained  model  often  call  for 
minimum  wage  increases  as a way  of assisting  the  poor.  Inevitably,  then,  the  political  debate 
becomes  one  of  youth  disemployment  effect  vs.  poverty.  What  is often  overlooked  in  this  debate 
is that  there  may  well  be other  political  reasons  for either  supporting  or opposing  the  minimum 
wage.  And  perhaps  the  most  unfortunate  consequence  has  been  that  we  have  lost  sight  of  the 
larger  macroeconomic  arguments  for  the  minimum  wage. 
The  specific  focus  of the  demand  constrained  model  has  been  on  the  youth  labor  market. 
For  the  longest  period,  the  prevailing  wisdom  has  been  that  the  minimum  wage  exacts  its greatest 
toll  on  the  youth  labor  market,  that  a binding  wage  floor  will  reduce  employment  for  younger  and 
less-skilled  workers.  Meyer  and  Wise  in a study  for  the  1973-78  period  estimated  that  if there 
were  no  minimum  wage,  employment  among  out-of  school  male  youth  16-19  years  of  age  would 
have  been  about  4 percent  higher  and  employment  of  those  20-24  would  have  been  2 percent 
higher.  And  the  employment  increases  would  have  been  even  greater  among  black  youth:  6 
percent  for  those  16-24,  and  10 percent  for  those  16-17.  They  found  that  the  minimum  wage  had 
little  effect  on  expected  earnings  of youth.  Higher  wage  rates  of  some  youths  were  about  offset  by 
the  nonemployment  of others.  Had  the  minimum  wage  not  been  raised  over  this  period,  inflation 
would  have  greatly  moderated  the  adverse  effects  of  the  minimum.  Had  the  minimum  remained  at 
its  1973 level,  approximately  2/3 of potential  employment  gains  from  eliminating  the  minimum 
would  have  been  attained.  Their  findings  tend  to support  the  hypothesis  that  the  effects  of  the 
minimum  are concentrated  on  youth  with  subminimum  wage  rates.  They  thus  find  no  evidence 
that  the  wage  rates  of  youth  with  market  rates  above  the  minimum  were  bid  up  (Meyer  & Wise, 
1983).  In a more  recent  study,  David  Neumark  and  William  Wascher,  on  the  basis  of  national  time 
5 series  data  from  the  1960s  through  the  197Os, showed  that  a  10 percent  increase  in the  minimum 
wage  apparently  reduced  teenage  employment  by  l-3  percent  with  proportionately  smaller  effects 
for  20-24  year  olds.  On  the  basis  of panel  data  they  concluded  that  youth  subminimums,  though 
not  necessarily  student  subminimums,  moderated  the displacement  effects  of minimum  wages  on 
teenagers  (Neumark  & Wascher,  1992). 
The  supply  constrained  model  in recent  years  has  offered  a rejoinder  to the  demand 
constrained  model,  most  notably  through  the  work  of  Card,  Katz,  and  Krueger.  At  first  they 
challenged  Neumark’s  and  Wascher’s  methodology,  arguing  that  their  conclusions  were 
contingent  on  whether  they  held  constant  a variable  measuring  the  “proportion  of  the  aged  group 
enrolled  in school.”  When  this  variable  was  included,  the  minimum  wage  index  had  a statistically 
significant  negative  effect  on employment.  But  when  this  variable  was excluded,  the  minimum 
wage  had  a “statistically  insignificant  and  positive  contemporaneous  effect  on  teenage 
employment  (Card,  Katz  & Krueger,  1994,  p. 488).”  On  the  contrary,  in a study  on  the  effects  of 
increasing  minimum  wages  in  California,  Card  showed  that  increases  did  not  result  in decreases  in 
employment.  During  July  of  1988,  California’s  minimum  wage  was  raised  from  $3.35  -- then  the 
prevailing  federal  minimum  -- to $4.25.  The  unemployment  rate  in California  fell  from  5.8  to 5.1 
percent  from  1987-1989.  During  the  same  period,  the  national  rate  fell  from  6.2  to 5.3  percent. 
This  would  suggest  that  economic  growth  in California  was  similar  to, or maybe  slightly  slower 
than,  the  rest  of  the  nation.  But  the  actual  pattern  was  quite  different  for  California  teenagers, 
where  the  unemployment  rate  fell  3 percent  from  16.9 to  13.9 percent.  The  average  U.S.  rate 
only  fell  by  1.9 percent  from  16.9 to  15 percent.  The  rise  in minimum  wages  raised  the  wages  of 
low-wage  workers,  with  no  adverse  effects  on employment  (Card,  1992).  Similarly,  Katz  and 
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little  evidence  of  significant  adverse  effects  of minimum  wage  increases  on employment  (Katz  & 
Krueger,  1992). 
In another  study  of  the  fast-food  industry  in New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania,  Card  and 
Krueger  found  that  a rise  in the  minimum  wage,  from  $4.25  to $5.05  had  little  disemployment 
effect.  The  study  focused  primarily  on  New  Jersey  where  the  minimum  wage  raise  took  effect, 
with  Pennsylvania  serving  as the  control  group.  The  average  starting  wage  at fast  food  restaurants 
in New  Jersey  increased  by  10 percent  following  the  minimum  wage  increase.  But  the  minimum 
wage  increase  had  no  apparent  “spillover”  on  high-wage  restaurants.  Within  New  Jersey, 
employment  expanded  at low  wage  stores  -- those  paying  $4.25  per  hour  -- and  contracted  at 
high-wage  stores  -- those  paying  $5.00  or more  per  hour.  Employment  also  contracted  between 
February  and  November  1992  at fast-food  stores  that  were  unaffected  by  the rise  in  minimum 
wage  -- those  stores  in Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey  paying  $5.00  or  more  per  hour. 
Card  and  Krueger  also  found  little  by  way  of  a substitution  effect,  that  there  wasn’t  an 
overwhelming  tendency  for  employers  to compensate  for  higher  wages  through  reductions  in 
fringe  benefits.  In  their  initial  survey,  Card  and  Krueger  found  that  19 percent  offered  workers 
free  meals,  72 percent  offered  reduced-priced  meals,  and  9 percent  offered  a combination  of  both 
free  and  reduced-priced  meals.  In their  follow-up  survey,  they  found  that  while  the  proportion  of 
restaurants  in both  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  offering  reduced-priced  meals  fell  after  the  wage 
hike,  there  was  an increase  in the  proportion  of restaurants  offering  free  meals.  And  relative  to 
Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey  stores  actually  shifted  towards  more  generous  provision  -- though  the 
relative  shift  wasn’t  considered  to be statistically  significant.  Although  the  minimum-wage  increase 
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onto  the  consumer,  there  was  no  evidence  that  prices  rose  faster  among  stores  in  New  Jersey  that 
were  most  affected  by  the rise  in the  minimum  wage.  Moreover,  the  raise  in minimum  wage  didn’t 
negatively  affect  the  number  of  store  openings,  and  it had  no disemployment  effect  (Card  & 
Krueger,  1994). 
The  Politics  of  Models 
These  studies,  however,  have  not  been  without  their  controversy.  The  principal  concerns 
have  been  with  the  unknown.  One  such  unknown  is just  how  much  can  the  minimum  wage  be 
raised  -- even  within  the  parameters  of the  Card  and  Krueger  model  -- without  risking  a serious 
disemployment  effect.  John  Kennan,  for  instance,  has  suggested  that  Card  and  Krueger  accept  at 
face  value  results  that  show  minimum  wage  increases  will  not  have  adverse  consequences.  It is 
simply  not  known  that  there  would  not  be  adverse  consequences  were  the  minimum  wage  to  be 
increased  beyond  a certain  threshold.  Moreover,  it is unlikely  that  we  will  find  out  even  if we  were 
to employ  a more  sophisticated  methodology  on  the  existing  body  of data.  Rather  what  is needed 
is more  sophisticated  data  (Kennan,  1995).  An  important  subtext,  often  neglected,  to the  whole 
minimum  wage  debate  is that  there  isn’t  any  conclusive  data  to make  any  definitive  statements 
about  any  effects  at all,  whether  they  be positive  or negative.  In effect  the  issue  becomes  the 
model  and  its  legitimacy,  with  different  groups  having  to varying  degrees  a stake  in it. 
Consequently,  that  model  which  is adopted  will  have  an impact  on  different  groups  of people. 
That  there  is this  level  of ambiguity  in the  data  might  suggest  that  the  Laswell  model  of politics 
tells  us more  about  the  minimum  wage  than  does  the  traditional  economics  text  book  analysis. 
8 Even  if it isn’t  clear  from  the  Card  and  Krueger  study  that  increases  in the  minimum  wage 
will  not  absolutely  have  a disemployment  effect  it should  be patently  clear  that  the  evidence  is at 
least  ambiguous,  which  in a political  context  riven  with  interest  groups  renders  it susceptible  to 
manipulation.  There  would  appear  to be evidence  to suggest  that  we  may  simply  know  very  little 
about  the  minimum  wage  or its effects.  Charles  Brown  has  suggested  that  the  minimum  wage  is 
essentially  overrated  by both  critics  and  supporters  alike.  Since  its passage  in  1938,  it has 
averaged  a bit  less  than  half  of hourly  earnings.  Those  who  earn  the  minimum  wage  account  for  6- 
12 percent  of those  employed  and  less  than  five  percent  of wage  and  salary  income.  The  reduction 
in employment  in the  standard  model  isn’t  necessarily  accomplished  by any  number  of  workers 
being  discharged  because  the  turnover  rates  in minimum  wage  jobs  are on  the  order  of  12- 15 
percent  per  month.  Nevertheless,  there  are complications  to empirical  estimates  of  the  effects  of 
the  minimum  which  stem  largely  from  the  fact  that  the FLSA  has  exempted  some  employers. 
Those  exempted  were  generally  smaller  ones,  with  the  standard  of “smallness”  gradually  being 
tightened  over  time.  As  of  1988,  the  uncovered  sector  consisted  mostly  of  retail  trade  and  service 
employees.  Therefore,  the  basic  message  for  empirical  work  is that  one  must  account  for  the 
extent  of coverage  and  elasticity  of  total  unskilled  employment  with  respect  to the  minimum  that 
will  be  smaller  than  elasticity  of demand.  The  second  complication  is that  minimum  wage  workers 
bear  no  unique  identifying  marks  besides  wage  rates.  The  effects  of the  minimum  wage  on 
employment  are  smaller  than  one  would  have  supposed,  and  part  of  this  small  effect  is due  to the 
fallacy  of inflated  denomination.  But  it is also  hard  to see  any  evidence  that  minimum  wage 
increases  have  benefits  which  would  overcome  an economist’s  aversion  to interfering  with 
reasonably  competitive  markets  (Brown,  1988). 
9 The  political  question  to arise,  then,  is how  the  focus  has  come  to be specifically  on  the 
effects  of  the  youth  labor  market?  How  is it that  this  model  has  become  the  accepted  model  for 
approaching  the  issue  of  the  minimum  wage?  Card  and  Krueger  have  suggested  that  the  answer 
may  have  something  to do  with  publication  bias.  Through  a meta-analysis  of minimum  wage 
studies,  they  concluded  the  existence  of a publication  bias  that  often  results  in the  types  of  studies 
we  are  accustomed  to seeing.  Because  journals  will  not  publish  results  that  aren’t  statistically 
significant  and  that  significance  is generally  defined  as a c ratio  in excess  of  2, there  is a tendency 
for  editors  and  reviewers  to look  more  favorably  on  those  studies  with  statistically  significant 
results.  In the  case  of  the  minimum  wage  this  problem  is compounded  by the  strong  theoretical 
presumption  of  the  economics  profession  that  increases  in the  minimum  wage  will  lead  to 
decreases  in employment.  This  in turn  may  lead  to further  biases  in that  1) reviewers  and  editors 
may  be predisposed  to accepting  those  papers  that  can  show  a “significant  negative  effect”  of  the 
minimum  wage;  and  2) this  criterion  of a “significant  negative  effect”  will  become  a guide  to 
choosing  empirical  specifications.  The  choices  made  in this  regard  are then  intended  to ensure  that 
the  results  are  statistically  significant  (Card  & Krueger,  1995).  This  in part  may  account  for  the 
principal  focus  of many  studies  being  on  the  youth  disemployment  effect. 
One  possible  counter  argument  to the  youth  disemployment  effect  is that  the  minimum 
wage  might  be viewed  as a positive  vehicle  for  lifting  those  at the low  end  of  the  wage  scale  out 
of poverty.  The  poverty  argument,  as this  might  be referred  to  suggests  that  an increase  in  the 
minimum  would  make  low-wage/low  skill jobs  attractive  to those  who  are currently  on  welfare 
(Ellwood,  1988;  Bane  and  Ellwood,  1994).  It is the  argument  that  individuals  do  respond  to 
changes  in expected  net  income  on  wealth  or net  prices  of  working  and  saving  brought  about  by 
10 transfer  programs.  Although  it is believed  that  current  transfer  programs  do  have  an impact  on 
overall  labor  supply,  it is difficult  to conclude  precisely  just  what  that  impact  may  be (Danziger, 
Haveman  & Plotnick,  1981).  Since  much  of the  research  on  poverty  shows  that  many  on  welfare 
don’t  work  because  it is simply  too  costly  to do  so, raising  the  minimum  wage  might  have  the 
effect  of offering  positive  inducement  to work.  In addition,  it would  offer  some  measure  of 
integrity  to those  jobs  considered  “menial”  that  any  number  of individuals  who  previously  shunned 
them  will  now  be proud  to have  them.  Hence  the  principal  reason  for raising  the  minimum  wage  is 
so that  those  at the  bottom  end  of  the  income  distribution  can  earn  a wage  that  places  them  above 
the poverty  level. 
Arguments  against  the  poverty  argument  for  raising  the minimum  wage  often  center  on 
the  assumption  that  many  minimum  wage  earners  simply  aren’t  poor.  Earners  of  the  minimum 
wage  are for  the  most  part  teenagers  or contributing  members  of  a household  budget.  Those  who 
fall  into  the  category  of  the  dependent  poor  are  not  currently  employed  in  those  jobs,  even  though 
those  are the jobs  they  would  most  likely  qualify  for  (Burtless,  1995).  On  these  grounds,  it is 
often  concluded  that  raising  the  minimum  wage  would  not  greatly  help  the  poor.  Shapiro,  for 
instance,  posed  the  question  in terms  of  whether  increasing  the  minimum  wage  would  help  the 
homeless.  It would  not,  he concluded,  because  minimum  wage  workers  generally  aren’t  primary 
wage  earners  in their  families.  He  noted  that  in  1986 just  under  2 percent  of  husbands  and  70 
percent  of  wives  earned  the prevailing  minimum  wage.  It was  more  likely  that  other  family 
members  -- sons  and  daughters  -- would  earn  the  minimum  wage.  In  1985,  only  18.5 percent 
came  from  families  with  incomes  below  the  poverty  line;  11.6 percent  had  incomes  between  100 
and  150 percent  of the  poverty  line  and  69.8  percent  had  incomes  considerably  above  the  poverty 
11 line.  Since  most  homeless  don’t  have  jobs,  it is doubtful  that  they  would  be helped  by an increase 
in the  minimum  wage  (Shapiro,  1990-91;  Burkhauser  & Finegan,  1989). 
Still,  there  is a political  problem  here.  Schram,  for  instance,  has  suggested  that  when  it 
comes  to the  field  of poverty  research,  it has  become  fashionable  to apply  social  science 
methodologies  to what  is otherwise  an ideological  position  for  the  purpose  of  giving  it an 
imprimatur  of  legitimacy  (Schram,  1995).  As much  as his is a voice  from  the  left,  there  might 
appear  to be  some  element  of  truth  to it. Those  who  get  mired  in  the  particulars  of  a model  often 
overlook  the  particular  characteristics  of those  who  earn  the  minimum  wage.  Those  who  argue 
against  the  minimum  wage  often  argue  that  it wouldn’t  be beneficial  to the  poor  because  most  of 
those  who  collect  the  minimum  wage  aren’t  poor.  Data  from  the  Department  of Labor  actually 
suggests  that  the  percentage  of  those  earning  the  minimum  wage  decreased  from  1979  to  1994. 
Even  though  the  percentage  of  those  earning  the  minimum  wage  was  relatively  low,  what  is 
interesting  is the  actual  decline  because  it also  appears  to coincide  with  a period  when  the 
minimum  wage  declined  in value.  Table  I shows  the declining  percentage  of those  earning 
minimum  wage. 
Table I Percent of Hourly Paid Workers  Earning Minimum Wage 
Year  Both  Sexes  Men  Women 
1979  13.3  7.7  20.2 
1980  15.1  9.6  21.6 
1981  15.1  9.6  21.2 
1982  12.8  8.6  17.3 
1983  12.2  8.4  16.4 
1984  11.0  7.5  14.8 
1985  9.9  6.9  13.2 
1986  8.8  6.9  11.9 
1987  7.9  5.4  10.5 







5.1  3.5  6.7 
5.1  3.3  7.0 
9.3  6.7  11.8 
7.6  5.7  9.5 
6.6  5.0  8.2 
6.2  4.7  7.8 
Source:  Drawn  from  Table  9, U.S.  Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics, 
unpublished  tabulations  from  the  Current  Population  Survey  (CPS) 
It also  may  not  be the case  that  most  of  those  earning  the  minimum  wage  are  teenagers. 
Many  are  in fact  over  twenty  five  years  old,  though  they  never  married.  This  can  be  seen  in Table 
II. 
Table  II Percentage  of Minimum  Wage  Earners  by Sex,  Marital  Status  and  Age 
Both  Sexes  Men  Women 
Total,  16 years  and  over  6.2  4.7  7.8 
Never  Married  11.3  9.4  13.7 
16 to  24 years  15.7  13.2  18.5 
25  and  over  years  5.1  4.3  6.2 
25  to 54 years  5.0  4.2  6.2 
Married,  spouse  present  3.3  1.9  4.7 
16 to  24  years  8.5  5.2  11.4 
25  and  over  years  2.9  1.7  4.2 
25  to 54  years  2.7  1.4  4.1 
Other  Marital  Status  5.4  2.9  6.9 
16 to 24 years  13.2  6.1  16.9 
25  and  over  years  5.1  2.8  6.5 
25  to 54  years  4.6  2.6  6.0 
Source:  Drawn  from  Table  7, U.S.  Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics, 
unpublished  tabulations  from  the  CPS. 
Although  there  is a higher  percentage  of women  earning  the  minimum  wage  than  men  relatively 
speaking,  the  percentage  of  women  earning  the  minimum  wage  in  1979  was  considerably  higher. 
The  gap  between  men  and  women  narrows  from  12.5 in  1979  to 3.1 in  1994.  Although  it is true 
that  the  highest  percentage  of  minimum  wage  workers  are  to be found  among  the  16-24  age 
cohort,  there  is still  a considerable  number  of minimum  wage  earners  outside  that  cohort.  When 
13 we  look  at how  the  minimum  wage  has  fallen  in value,  particularly  in relation  to the  average 
annual  hourly  wage,  we  also  find  that  during  this  period  the  minimum  wage  fell  from  a value  of 
close  to 50 percent  to less  than  40 percent.  This  can  be seen  in  Table  III. 
Table III Comparison  Between  Minimum and Average Annual 
Year  Minimum  Annual  Average  Percentage 
1938*  $ .25  NA  NA 
1939”  .30  NA  NA 
1945  .40  %‘;iG  NA 
1947  .40  35.4 
1950*  .75  1.33  56.4 
1956*  1.00  1.80  55.6 
1961*  1.15  2.14  53.7 
1963”  1.25  2.28  54.8 
1967*  1.40  2.68  52.2 
1968*  1.60  2.85  56.1 
1974”  2.00  4.24  47.2 
1975*  2.10  4.53  46.4 
1976*  2.30  4.86  47.3 
1978*  2.65  5.69  46.6 
1979”  2.90  6.16  47.1 
1980*  3.10  6.66  46.5 
1981”  3.35  7.25  46.2 
1990”  3.80  10.01  38.0 
1991*  4.25  10.32  41.2 
1995  4.25  11.46  37.1 
* These  are  the  years  that  increases  in the  minimum  wage  took  effect. 
Source:  “History  of the  Federal  Minimum  Wage  Rates  Under  the  Fair  Labor  Standards 
Act  --  1938  Through  1991,”  U.S.  Department  of Labor,  Employment  Standards 
Administration;  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Labstat  Series  Report,  Current  Employment 
Statistics,  Series  EEUOO500006 
If there  is a relationship,  it would  seem  to have  some  critical  implications.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
might  be inferred  that  fewer  people  earning  the  minimum  wage  is a measure  of progress  in that 
fewer  minimum  wage  earners  might  presuppose  that  these  workers  have  been  successful  in 
moving  out  of  minimum  wage  jobs.  This  is clearly  an argument  that  supporters  of  the  “Demand 
14 constrained”  model  are likely  to make.  On  the  other  hand,  it is perhaps  disturbing  that  this  trend 
does  coincide  with  the  declining  value  of  the  minimum  wage.  We  are perhaps  left  to wonder 
whether  those  who  were  earning  the  minimum  wage  previously  didn’t  simply  drop  out  because 
the  value  of the  wage  was  simply  inadequate.  Many  of these  people,  especially  women  with 
children,  could  receive  greater  income  through  public  assistance  programs.  If this  is true,  it would 
lend  support  to  the  notion  that  a higher  wage,  or at least  one  that  more  closely  approximates  50 
percent  of  annual  average  hourly  earnings,  will  attract  those  at the  low  end  of  wage  scale  into  the 
labor  market.  It is the  latter  argument  that  we  are more  likely  to  see  from  those  supporters  of  the 
“Supply  constrained”  model. 
But  it might  also  explain  why  the  youth  labor  market  has  become  the  principal  focus  of  the 
debate.  If the  result  of declining  value  is that  the  only  labor  market  willing  to accept  such  wages 
are youth,  it becomes  a foregone  conclusion  that  they  will  become  the  primary  subject  of  the 
debate.  That  this  group  might  bear  some  costs  as a function  of  increasing  the  minimum  wage  still 
does  not  prove  that  there  is data  on  the  former  and  none  on  the  latter.  It might  well  be  that  the 
focus  on  the  youth  labor  market  speaks  more  to the  politics  of  the  issue  and  less  to the  substantive 
issues  inherent  to either  model.  In the  absence  of hard  core  empirical  data,  all there  is is theory 
and  theoretical  presuppositions.  In  any  policy  issue,  politics  is bound  to rear  its  head,  but  all the 
more  so when  there  is no  conclusive  data  one  way  or  the  other. 
But  as Levitan  and  Belous  suggest,  the  particular  focus  on  the  teen  labor  market  has 
nonetheless  had  a distortive  effect,  for  it could  be misleading,  if not  altogether  incorrect,  to extend 
these  findings  to the  adult  labor  market.  “ That  the  minimum  wage  creates  some  unemployment 
does  not  help  policymakers  in drafting  a wage  floor  program.  More  important  is how  much 
15 unemployment  is created  by the  wage  floor  (Levitan  & Belous,  1979,  p.  lSO).”  On  the  contrary, 
they  suggest  that  the  dire  predictions  offered  by neo-classical  economists  speak  more  to their 
ideological  biases  and  have  little  support  in empirical  research.  As  they  see it, the  best  evidence 
suggests  that  the  minimum  wage  has  not  been  a major  cause  of  unemployment.  Although  some 
job  loss  has  been  detected,  it has  been  considerably  smaller  than  that  alleged  by orthodox 
economists.  Statistical  evidence  actually  suggests  that  a wage  floor  has  the power  to increase 
significantly  the  wages  of the  working  poor.  And  while  minimum  wages  may  result  in some 
unemployment  and  other  negative  effects  for  adult  workers,  the  income  gains  due  to  that 
minimum  are  far greater  than  any  injury.  Adult  workers  on  balance  appear  to be made  better  off 
under  a wage  floor,  although  the  tradeoff  for  teenagers  may  be even  more  pronounced  (Levitan  & 
Belous,  1979,  pp.  151-153).  To  some  extent  this  argument  is similar  to one  made  by Freeman 
and  Medoff  with  regards  to unions.  Although  there  may  be some  reduced  profitability  for  many 
unionized  firms,  there  may  still  be some  social  efficiency  gains  arising  from  wage  and  other 
securities  derived  from  collective  bargaining  agreements  (Freeman  & Medoff,  1984). 
The  reality,  however,  is that  there  may  be no  conclusive  data  because  the  minimum  wage 
has  been  so low,  relative  to other  wages,  that  it couldn’t  possibly  make  a difference.  That  is, 
minimum  wage  increases  have  been  so inconsequential  that  it is hard  to detect  the  impact. 
According  to a study  by Alida  Castielo  Freeman  and  Richard  Freeman  (1991),  while  the  minimum 
is a classic  textbook  example  of  government  setting  the  price  of  labor,  it is also  one  of  the  few 
clear  tests  of  economics  of derived  demand.  The  estimated  reduction  of employment  for  teenagers 
is often  imprecisely  determined  or “smaller”  than  one  would  expect.  There  are essentially  three 
explanations  consistent  with  labor  demand  analysis  for  why  research  yields  weak  results  on 
16 employment  effects  of the  U.S.  minimum.  One  is that  there  is considerable  noncompliance  with 
the  minimum  wage,  thereby  making  the  law  ineffective.  Second,  employers  may  resp_ond to the 
minimum  by reducing  fringe  benefits,  training,  and  quality  of  work  conditions  to a greater  extent 
than  employment.  And  third,  the  minimum  may  have  been  so low,  especially  in the  198Os, that  it 
disemployed  too  few  workers  to be detectable  in a world  where  shifts  in  supply  and  demand 
schedules  create  considerable  random  variation  in employment.  Rather,  in order  to find  a clear 
employment  effect,  one  must  examine  a minimum  wage  that  bites  rather  than  nibbles  at the  edges 
of  the job  market.  To  test  this  out,  the  Freemans  examined  the  extension  of  the  U.S.  federal 
minimum  to Puerto  Rico  during  the  1970s.  There  the  average  hourly  pay  on  the  island  was 
roughly  half  of that  on  the  mainland,  in which  case  the effects  of the  minimum  would  have  been 
roughly  the  equivalent  of doubling  the  minimum  in the  U.S.  What  the  case  of Puerto  Rico  showed 
was  that  the  extension  of  the  minimum  wage  did  have  the  clear-cut  effects  typical  of  a textbook 
diagram  (Freeman  & Freeman,  1991,  pp.l-2  ). But  it also  had  to be clear  that  the  increase  would 
indeed  be significant.  Robert  Gordon  too,  has  alluded  to this  by suggesting  that  minimum  wage 
increases  may  simply  not  have  had  the  predicted  text-book  effect  because  it was  so much  lower 
than  a market  clearing  wage  (Gordon,  1995). 
. 
We  don’t  know  that  a sizeable  segment  of  the  population  would  not  be helped  by  an 
increase  in the  minimum  wage;  only  that  the prevailing  model  suggests  that  an increase  in the 
minimum  wage  would  result  in a youth  disemployment  effect.  There  really  isn’t  any  data  to prove 
that  an increased  minimum  wage  would  not  assist  these  people.  It doesn’t  necessarily  follow  that 
because  many  of these  individuals  don’t  currently  hold  minimum  wage  jobs  they  wouldn’t  be 
estpratrad~ssrsrent~lnr’~~l-ut~riarra  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  +n 
16 work.  On  the  contrary,  the  general  ambiguity  in the  data  would  appear  to lead  to the  conclusion 
that  there  isn’t  sufficient  data  to make  such  a determination.  Rather  determinations  are  based  on 
generalizations  on  the  basis  of what  minimum  wage  positions  have  attracted.  On  the  contrary,  if it 
can  be  shown  that  slight  increases  in the  minimum  wage  will  not  affect  those  who  might  receive 
greater  benefit  from  the  welfare  system,  the  poverty  argument  is effectively  disqualified.  All  we 
are left  with,  then,  is the  ill effect  on  the  teen  labor  market?  Since  teenagers  have  little  political 
clout,  the  effect  is to have  greater  support  for  keeping  the  minimum  where  it is -- and  even  to 
have  sub-minimums  -- than  to raise  them.  And  yet,  it still  has  not  been  proven  that  the  poor  will 
not  be helped;  only  that  we  simply  do  not  have  data. 
Failure  of  Poverty  Arguments? 
Another  way  to pose  the  question  is to ask just  why  haven’t  poverty  arguments  been 
strong  enough  to induce  increases  in the  minimum  wage?  Or why  is it that  the  only  apparently 
viable  defense  against  poverty  arguments  are the  supposed  ill effects  on  the  teen  labor  market? 
Why  hasn’t  the  other  side  of  the  story  been  heard?  Although  economic  arguments  will  certainly  be 
given  their  due,  it is hard  to believe  that  members  of Congress  will  give  greater  consideration  to 
the  merits  of  a model  than  their  constituent  interests. 
On one  level,  the  minimum  wage  is a question  of whether  a wage  floor  will  have  an 
adverse  effect  on  employment  or a beneficial  effect  on  specifically  targeted  groups.  But  on 
another  level,  it is a question  of  how  it impacts  regions  of  the  country  differently.  It should  first  be 
noted  that  an increase  in the  minimum  wage  would  not  have  the  same  effect  on  all regions  of  the 
country.  In those  regions  of  the  country  where  wages  are relatively  high,  an increase  in  the 
18 minimum  is likely  to have  less  of  an impact  on  the  overall  wage  structure  than  in those  regions 
where  wages  are relatively  low.  Moreover,  in those  regions  where  the  legal  climate  is favorable  to 
business  through  “right-to-work”  laws,  because  unionization  is weak  -- effectively  resulting  in the 
absence  of a wage  floor  -- a legal  wage  floor  could  have  much  more  of  an impact.  More  to the 
point,  in those  regions  where  “right-to-work”  laws  exist,  the  lobby  for  an increase  in the  minimum 
wage  will  be less.  That  lobby  has  traditionally  been  organized  labor. 
One  argument  for  why  the  poverty  argument  has  been  ineffectual  is because  in 
contemporary  political  discourse  poverty  programs  are generally  under  assault  (Schram,  1995; 
Katz,  1989).  So  if the  minimum  wage  is couched  as a poverty  argument,  it is bound  to fail 
whereas  if couched  as a larger  labor  issue  with  the  full  political  support  of  labor  constituents  it is 
more  likely  to succeed.  The  chief  labor  constituents  would  be organized  labor,  but  labor  unions 
have  generally  been  in a state  of decline  since  the  1950s  and  ever  more  so since  the  early  1980s. 
The  period  of  greatest  stagnation  for  the  minimum  wage  also  appears  to have  been  a 
period  when  organized  labor  suffered  its  greatest  decline.  198 1, in particular,  was  a watershed  for 
labor,  as it was  when  then  President  Ronald  Reagan  fired  the  PATCO  air traffic  controllers.  Piore 
reminds  us that  Reagan’s  action  against  PATCO  “galvanized  anti-union  managerial  factions  in a 
whole  variety  of industries  and  occupations  where  union  organization  had  previously  been 
unassailable.  And  it set the  stage  for  a prolonged  period  of union  give  backs  and  concession 
bargaining.”  1981 was  also  the  last  time  that  the  J?LSA would  be amended  until  1989.  The 
minimum  wage  was  essentially  allowed  to fall  relative  to average  wages,  from  47 percent  to 35 
percent.  And  this  was  the  longest  and  most  sustained  decline  since  its introduction  in the  1930s 
(Piore,  1995,  pp.  10 &  14). But  as Keeran  and  Tarpinian  also  suggest,  more  important  than 
19 Reagan’s  decertification  of PATCO  and  the  firing  of its  striking  members  was  his  anti-union 
appointments  to the  NLRB.  As  a result  those  companies  operating  during  a strike  in  the  1980s 
found  a strong  ally  in the  law  (Keeran  & Tarpinian,  1989-90).  And  to suggest  that  1981  was  a 
watershed  by  no  means  dismisses  the  trends  in many  southern  states  towards  “right-to-work”  laws 
which  effectively  barred  closed  shops.  Such  laws  provide  that  no  one  shall  be required  to belong 
to a union  or not  to as a condition  of employment,  and  that  no collective  bargaining  agreement 
shall  impose  such  a requirement  (Rees,  1989,  p.  113).  One  school  of  thought  even  suggests  that 
management  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  embarked  on  a systematic  plan  to undercut  labor  by 
closing  plants  and  relocating  facilities  to more  favorable  business  climates.  By closing  down  one 
plant  and  punishing  its workers,  workers  in other  plants  would  be forced  into  more  serviceable 
behavior  (Bowles,  Gordon  & Weisskopf,  1983). 
Unions  would  appear  to have  something  in common  with  minimum  wage  legislation,  not 
merely  because  they  seek  to accomplish  the  same  goals  -- ultimately  the  establishment  of  a 
minimum  level  of  subsistence  -- but  because  congressional  support  would  appear  to be stronger  in 
those  areas  where  union  density  is higher.  Politically  speaking,  it would  be easier  to support  a 
legal  wage  floor  in those  regions  where  unions  have  successfully  created  a prevailing  wage  rate. 
The  unions,  in other  words,  have  already  done  the  heavy  lifting  and  the  statutory  wage  floor 
becomes  an added  layer  of protection.  But  in those  regions  where  no prevailing  wage  rates  exist 
because  there  have  been  no unions  to do  the  heavy  lifting,  the  statutory  wage  floor  is more  likely 
to have  an impact  on  the  overall  wage  structure.  To  put  it differently,  those  states  that  have 
already  signaled  the  desire  to maintain  low  wage  rates  through  laws  generally  perceived  to be 
hostile  to unions,  are  not  going  to be  any  more  amenable  to legislation  that  does  for  the  entire 
20 labor  market  what  unions  have  only  been  able  to accomplish  for  a very  small  segment. 
The  union  also  has  an interest  in  supporting  increases  in the  minimum  wage  insofar  as an 
increase  may  effectively  increase  the  demand  for  skilled  labor.  As  skilled  workers  tend  to be 
unionized,  unions  are only  increasing  the  demand  for  their  own  labor  by supporting  higher 
minimum  wages  (Kau  & Kau,  1973;  Hobson  & Maurice,  1983).  But  unions  also  have  an interest 
in supporting  higher  minimum  wages  insofar  as they  create  a stronger  cushion  for  themselves.  A 
viable  wage  floor,  especially  during  hard  economic  times,  would  create  an absolute  limit  to the 
concessions  labor  might  be forced  to give.  Or stated  differently,  a high  minimum  wage  could 
effectively  result  in “right-to-work”  laws  having  less of  a negative  effect  on  wages  in certain 
regions  of  the  country. 
Congressional  Voting 
Evidence  of the  declining  influence  of unions  along  with  different  regional  interests  would 
appear  to be evident  in congressional  voting  patterns.  From  a theoretical  stance,  in attempting  to 
understand  the  voting  behavior  of members  of  Congress,  we  would  expect  that  representatives 
from  those  states  with  higher  union  density  to vote  for  minimum  wage  increases  while  those  with 
lower  densities  -- particularly  those  from  “right-to-work”  states  to vote  against.  Although  union 
density  overall  is very  low,  there  are clearly  relative  differences  between  states.  On  the  whole, 
union  density,  as might  be expected,  is lower  in those  states  that  have  “right-to-work”  laws. 
Because  there  is no  label  which  easily  captures  the exact  opposite  of  “right-to-work,”  the  only 
basis  upon  which  we  can  measure  the  opposite  is higher  union  density.  A look  at the  percentage 
of unionized  labor  on  a state  by  state  basis  shows  Northern  industrialized  states  to have  higher 
21 concentrations  of unionized  workers  than  Southern  states,  and  particularly  those  with  right  to 
work  laws.  This  can  be  seen  in Table  IV. 
Table IV Percentage  of Unionized  Workers 
State  Percentage  Rank 
Alabama*  13.6  25 
Alaska  23.1  4 
Arizona*  8.0  41 
Arkansas*  7.8  42 
California  17.7  15 
Colorado  9.9  33 
Connecticut  20.2  9 
Delaware  13.0  26 
D.C.  15.1  22 
Florida*  7.3  44 
Georgia*  6.8  46 
Hawaii  24.6  2 
Idaho*  8.1  40 
Illinois  20.2  8 
Indiana  16.5  17 
Iowa*  12.1  29 
Kansas*  10.2  31 
Kentucky  12.6  27 
Louisiana*  7.0  45 
Maine  15.6  21 
Maryland  14.9  23 
Massachusetts  16.2  19 
Michigan  23.7  3 
Minnesota  20.3  7 
Mississippi*  5.2  49 
Missouri  14.6  24 
Montana  15.8  20 
Nebraska*  9.1  38 
Nevada*  20.2  10 
New  Hampshire  12.6  28 
New  Jersey  21.9  5 
New  Mexico  9.4  35 
New  York  27.7  1 
North  Carolina*  4.2  50 
North  Dakota*  10.0  32 
Ohio  18.5  14 
22 Oklahoma  9.3  36 
Oregon  20.1  11 
Pennsylvania  18.9  13 
Rhode  Island  19.4  12 
South  Carolina*  3.3  51 
South  Dakota*  7.7  43 
Tennessee*  9.5  34 
Texas*  6.5  48 
Utah*  9.0  39 
Vermont  9.3  37 
Virginia*  6.7  47 
Washington  21.0  6 
West  Virginia  16.3  18 
Wisconsin  17.7  16 
Wyoming*  11.2  30 
* State  has  right-to-work-law 
Source:  Drawn  from  Table  8 in Barry  T. Hirsch  and  David  A.  Macpherson,  Union 
Membership  and  Earnings  Data  Book:  Compilations  from  the  Current  Population  Survey 
(1996  Edition)  (Washington,  The  Bureau  of  National  Affairs,  Inc.,  1996),  pp.  22-23 
The  key  question  is how  members  have  traditionally  voted  on  the  issue.  As  a general  rule, 
Democrats  tend  to vote  for  increases  while  Republicans  vote  against.  Because  these  tendencies 
conform  to preconceived  notions,  there  is nothing  interesting  in this  per  se. What  is interesting  are 
the  exceptions  to  these  general  rules.  In the  remainder  of  the  paper  I look  at the  congressional 
voting  patterns  of three  major  episodes  in minimum  wage  legislation:  1955,  1977 and  1989. 
The  increase  of  1955 is important  because,  in addition  to being  the  first  increase  since  the 
194Os, it also  represented  a significant  anomaly.  In  1955,  a Republican  president  specifically 
introduced  legislation  to raise  the  minimum  wage,  and  most  of  the  party  closed  ranks.  But  it was 
also  a critical  period  because  it was  a clear  example  of union  activism  on  the  issue.  In January  of 
1955,  during  his  State  of  the  Union  address,  President  Eisenhower  urged  modification  of  the 
FLSA  by calling  for  an increase  to ninety  cents  an hour.  Trade  unions  viewed  this  message  as a 
23 green  light  to resume  their  campaign  for  a higher  and  more  broadly  based  minimum  wage. 
Overall,  the  political  environment  appeared  to be somewhat  conducive.  For  one  thing,  the  last 
revision  had  not  been  since  1949 and  the  75 cents  an hour  minimum  wage  was  no  longer  viewed 
as adequate.  Moreover,  the  1954  elections  brought  the  Democrats  back  to power  and  in control 
of both  chambers  of  Congress.  And  with  them  came  a slightly  larger  contingent  of candidates  with 
labor  endorsements.  Also  both  the  AFL  and  CIO  in  their  separate  conventions  had  passed 
resolutions  urging  an increase  in the  minimum  from  $.75  to $1.25  and  an extension  of  the 
coverage. 
Four  unions  in particular  had  a stake  in the  increase:  The  International  Ladies’  Garment 
Workers  Union;  the  Amalgamated  Clothing  Workers  of America;  the  Textile  Workers  Union  of 
America;  and  the  Cap  and  Millinery  Workers.  The  industries  covered  by the  four  unions  were 
producers  of  light  products  that  were  typically  transported  for  sale  in nationally  competitive 
markets.  As they  saw  it, those  low-wage  producers  operating  at the  federal  minimum  constituted 
a threat  to the  organized  sector,  with  the  capacity  to produce  unemployment,  wage  cuts,  or  wage 
freezes  in the  unionized  sector.  A higher  minimum  wage  would  close,  or at least  narrow,  the 
competitive  gap,  thereby  serving  to preserve  employment  in  unionized  plants.  Thus  the  four 
unions  came  together  to create  an ad hoc  committee  that  was  to be formalized  as the  Joint 
Minimum  Wage  Committee  with  headquarters  in Washington.  Its principal  responsibility  was  to 
spearhead  the  legislative  effort  to raise  the  wage.  The  Committee  was  to be headed  by Arthur 
Goldberg,  a prominent  labor  attorney  who  would  go  on  to  be the  U.S.  Secretary  of Labor  in  the 
Kennedy  administration  before  being  appointed  to the  Supreme  Court. 
The  Committee  adopted  a strategy  which  consisted  of  four  basic  steps:  1) The  committee 
24 would  urge  as many  members  of Congress  as it could  to submit  their  own  minimum  wage  bills.  It 
sought  to do  this  by visiting  individual  members  of Congress;  2) The  Committee  planned  a visit 
with  the  President  by  the  presidents  of the  international  unions.  The  goal  here  was  to raise  the 
level  of publicity  to that  of  a foreign  summit;  3) The  Committee  planned  interviews  between  top 
union  leaders  and  the  House  and  Senate  leadership.  These  conferences  were  intended  to make  it 
clear  that  the  unions  really  meant  business,  and  that  they  weren’t  simply  carrying  on  routine 
agitation  for  another  measure;  and  4) The  regular  legislative  offices  of  both  the  AFL  and  CIO 
gave  the  same  message  to Congressmen  in general. 
By  mid-March,  the  Committee  had  settled  on  a focus,  which  was  to work  up public 
interest  in a minimum  of  $1.25  as that  which  was  ultimately  desirable  and justifiable,  but  settle  on 
something  between  $90  and  1.25. It also  planned  to build  up  testimony  for  extended  coverage 
with  the  understanding  that  action  on  coverage  might  have  to be postponed.  The  difficulty, 
however,  was  going  to come  from  Graham  A. Barden  (D-N.C.)  who  was  chair  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Education  and  Labor.  And  for  a while  it appeared  as though  it would  be a struggle 
between  organized  labor  and  Barden.  Barden  ruled  the  committee  with  a firm  hand  and  he  had  the 
votes  to back  him  up.  Consequently,  the  Committee  sought  to circumvent  the  House  Labor 
Committee  by  starting  action  in the  Senate,  where  it had  an ally  in  Senator  Paul  Douglas  of 
Illinois.  The  Committee  also  sought  to drum  up  grass  roots  support  for  an increase.  The  principal 
effort  was  to get  “communities”  to communicate  with  Congressmen,  rather  than  trade  unionists 
alone.  The  assumption  was  that  a higher  minimum  wage  would  be of  interest  to the  “community” 
and  that  it was  the  union’s  job  to motivate  the  community  to voice  that  interest.  To  do  this  the 
Committee  prepared  regional  staff  to go  out  and  talk  with  members  of  the  community.  It prepared 
25 handbooks  explaining  why  the  minimum  wage  was  first  implemented  and  why  it needed  to be 
increased.  Although  the  end  result  was  a compromise  of a $1.00  minimum  wage,  it is important  to 
note  that  at no  point  were  any  arguments  about  relieving  poverty  advanced.  The  minimum  wage 
simply  was  not  viewed  in those  terms.  It in part  came  about  because  the  President  set the  tone  for 
a non-partisan  effort  by introducing  it. But  it also  came  about  in larger  measure  because  of  the 
strong  efforts  of  organized  labor. 
The  1977  episode  is important  because  it was  the  last vote  on  the  minimum  wage  until 
1989.  It also  set  into  motion  a phased-in  wage  increase  with  the  last  increase  taking  effect  in 
1981,  which  itself  was  the  last  increase  until  1989. Whereas  the  1955 round  is indicative  of  union 
strength,  1977 is somewhat  revealing  in its relative  weakness.  Still,  there  are lessons  to be drawn 
about  the  importance  of  labor.  During  the  1977 round,  pro-minimum-wage  forces  attempted  to 
end  the  historical  pattern  of minimum-wage  setting  by first  increasing  the  wage  floor  to a higher 
relative  rate  than  in most  previous  rounds,  and  second  by indexing  the  wage  floor  to inflation  so 
that  future  adjustments  would  be automatic.  Organized  labor,  as represented  by  the  AFL-CIO, 
proposed  an immediate  thirty  percent  increase  from  the  existing  rate  of $2.25  to $3.00.  They  also 
called  for  an automatic  mechanism  to be grounded  into  law  that  would  keep  the  minimum  wage  at 
60 percent  of  the  average  hourly  manufacturing  sector  wage.  As  labor  saw  it, these  demands  were 
in essence  the  “bread  and  butter  issues  of  wages  and jobs  (Levitan  & Belous,  1979,  p  130)” 
Though  there  was  some  support  among  Democratic  members  of  Congress,  the  Carter 
administration  wasn’t  willing  to support  a wage  as high  as that  proposed  by  the  AFL-CIO. 
Moreover,  the  Carter  administration  didn’t  feel  as beholden  to labor  as had  past  administrations 
because  the  labor  vote  during  the  1976 presidential  primaries  had  actually  gone  to Carter’s 
26 opponents,  many  of  whom  had  stronger  ties  to labor.  Feeling  free  from  this  political  constraint, 
the  Carter  administration  felt  that  it could  back  some  sort  of compromise  that  might  provide  some 
assistance  to  the  working  poor  without  creating  too  much  of  an inflationary  pressure.  The  Carter 
administration’s  more  modest  proposal  had  called  for  an immediate  increase  to $2.50  an hour  with 
future  minimum  levels  to be adjusted  annually  so that  they  would  always  remain  equal  to 50 
percent  of  average  manufacturing  wages  (Eccles,  1977,  p.  640).  As  it turned  out,  a majority  of  the 
House  Education  and  Labor  Committee  favored  the  addition  of  indexing  as an integral  part  of  a 
wage  floor  on  the  premise  that  the  working  poor  should  not  have  to await  the  findings  of  a 
commission  as their  already  meager  incomes  were  being  eroded.  The  committee  also  reasoned 
that  employers  too  would  benefit  from  stable  and  regular  patterns  of change,  as this  would  allow 
both  workers  and  business  executives  to anticipate  and  plan  for  the  increases.  While  opponents  of 
indexation  argued  that  it was  inflationary  in addition  to an impediment  to Congressional  oversight, 
the  majority  of  the  committee  viewed  the  periodic  review  process  to be unproductive  and  a waste 
of Congress’s  time  and  effort.  Moreover,  it was  simply  unfair  for  those  working  poor  dependent 
on  minimum  wages  to  see  their  wages  held  captive  to the  whims  of  the  political  process  which 
inevitably  had  to satisfy  the  diversity  of  interest  groups  (Levitan  & Belous,  1979,  pp.  122-I 32). 
In the  end,  a compromise  was  reached  whereby  the  minimum  wage  would  be increased  in  stages 
over  a three  year  period.  Although  the  end  of  this  staged  process  would  see  a minimum  wage  in 
excess  of  $3.00,  it wasn’t  the  immediate  increase  requested  by labor.  And  ultimately,  the  idea  of 
indexation  fell  by the  wayside.  The  compromise  reached  was  to raise  the  minimum  wage  through 
four  phase-ins  in lieu  of indexation.  When  the  issue  of a minimum  wage  increase  would  come  up 
again  in  1987,  Lane  Kirkland,  then  president  of  the  AFL-CIO  noted  in Congressional  testimony 
27 that  the  AFL-CIO  had  indeed  been  disappointed  when  in  1977 Congress  had  considered  but  failed 
to index  the  minimum  wage.  Had  that  indexation  occurred,  the minimum  wage  would  have 
reached  $4.45  by  1987  (Kirkland,  1987,  p. 297).  Still,  we  are left  to wonder  whether  the  AFL- 
CIO  plan  might  not  have  been  fully  enacted  had  labor  had  a better  relationship  with  the 
administration.  At the  same  time,  however,  it becomes  clear  that  the  process  of raising  the 
minimum  wage,  regardless  of  the  final  outcome,  did  involve  -- and  most  likely  required  -- the 
active  participation  of labor  as a major  player. 
Lastly,  1989  is important  because  it was  the  last  vote  until  the  present,  although  it set into 
motion  a two-staged  implementation  process.  Beginning  in  1955  we can  begin  to  see  some  very 
interesting  things,  Although  most  members  of Congress  overwhelmingly  voted  in favor  of  the 
wage  increase,  including  most  Republican  members,  a sizeable  number  of Democratic  members  of 
the House  also  voted  against  the  minimum  wage  and  again  they  were  primarily  from  the  “right-to- 
work”  states.  In fact,  there  were  more  Democratic  members  of  Congress  voting  against  the 
increase  than  Republican  members.  In Table  V we  can  see  from  which  states  both  Democratic 
votes  against  and  Republican  votes  for  come  from. 
Table V  Votes on the Minimum  Wage 
Democratic  Votes Against 
1955  1977 
Alabama*  (H)  Alabama* 
Arkansas*  (H)  Arizona* 
Georgia*  (H)  Arkansas* 
Mississippi*  (H)  Florida* 
South  Carolina*  (H)  Georgia* 
Tennessee*  (H)  Iowa* 









Colorado  (H) 
Florida*  (H) 
Georgia*  (H) 
Louisiana*  (H) 
Maryland  (H) 
Minnesota  (H) 
Mississippi*  (H) 
28 Virginia*  (H)  Indiana  (H) 
Maryland  (H) 
Michigan  (H) 
Minnesota  (H) 
Missouri  (H) 
Mississippi*  (H & S) 
Nebraska*  (S) 
New  Mexico  (H) 
North  Carolina*  (H & S) 
Oklahoma  (H) 
New  York  (H) 
South  Carolina*  (H) 
Texas*  (H) 
Virginia*  (H & S) 
North  Carolina*  (H) 
Oklahoma  (H&S) 
South  Carolina*  (H & S) 
Texas*  (H) 
Virginia*  (H) 
Republican  Votes for 
Alabama  (H) 
Alaska  (S) 
Connecticut  (S) 
Illinois  (H) 
Maine  (H) 
Massachusetts  (S) 
Minnesota  (H) 
New  Jersey  (H & S) 
New  Mexico  (S) 
New  York  (H & S) 
Oregon  (S) 
Pennsylvania  (H & S) 
Tennessee  (H&S) 
Washington  (H) 
Vermont  (S) 
Alaska  (H) 
California  (H) 
Connecticut  (H) 
Iowa  (H) 
Illinois  (H) 
Maine  (S) 
Massachusetts  (H) 
Maryland  (H) 
Michigan  (H) 
Minnesota  (S) 
North  Dakota  (S) 
New  Jersey  (H ) 
New  York  (H & S) 
Oregon  (S) 
Pennsylvania  (H & S) 
Rhode  Island  (H & S) 
South  Dakota  (S) 
Vermont  (H) 
* States  with  “Right-to-work”  laws 
S= votes  from  the  Senate;  H=votes  from  the  House  of  Representatives 
Source:  Drawn  from  Congressional  Quarterly Weekly Report (July  22,  1955),  pp.894-895; 
29 (October  15,  1977),  pp.  2210-2211;  and  (October  22,  1977),  p. 2278-2279 
In  1955,  Republicans  overwhelmingly  voted  for  the  increase.  The  story  there  was  actually  among 
those  who  voted  against.  Out  of  221  Democrats  in  the  House  who  voted,  29 voted  against. 
In  1977  there  were  282  Democratic  members  of  the  House  of  whom  63 voted  against  he 
minimum  wage.  In  the  Senate,  there  were  54 Democrats  of whom  seven  voted  against.  On  the 
Republican  side,  of  the  141 members  in the  House  17 voted  for  the  increase  whereas  in the  Senate 
seven  out  of  33 voted  for  the  increase.  In  1989,24  out  of  224  Democrats  in the  House  voted 
against  the  increase  whereas  in the  senate  only  two  out  of  52 voted  against.  On  the  Republican 
side,  22  out  of  147 in the  House  voted  for  the  increase  whereas  10 out  of  35 voted  for  it in  the 
Senate.  Proportionate  to their  numbers,  more  Democrats  in the  House  of  Representatives  appear 
to vote  against  increases  than  do  Republicans  voting  for  it. But  in the  Senate,  more  Republicans 
appear  to vote  for  it than  Democrats  voting  against.  Generally  speaking,  most  Democratic  votes 
in all three  episodes  tend  to come  from  “right-to-work”  states  whereas  most  Republican  votes  for, 
with  some  exceptions,  come  from  those  states  with  union  densities  above  10 percent. 
Implications 
That  Democratic  members  of  Congress  are willing  to vote  against  the  position  of  their 
party  at a minimum  demonstrates  the  inability  of modem  day  political  parties  to enforce  discipline 
on  its members.  This,  of course,  is nothing  new.  What  is more  important,  however,  is the 
apparent  view  different  regions  of  the country  take  to the  issue.  On  one  level  the  fact  that 
members  from  those  regions  with  high  union  densities  -- particularly  Republican  members  -- are 
willing  to vote  for  the  increase,  it might  imply  that  a key  interest  group  in affecting  how  members 
30 vote  is organized  labor.  On  another  level,  the  fact  that  most  Democratic  votes  against  the 
minimum  wage  comes  from  those  regions  where  there  are “right-to-work”  laws,  it might  be 
concluded  that  the  minimum  wage,  at least  in certain  areas,  has  a detrimental  effect  on  the  wage 
structure,  and  this  runs  contrary  to many  interests  in the  area.  That  is, if certain  regions  passed 
“right-to-work”  laws  with  the  intention  of becoming  more  competitive  and  hoping  to attract 
greater  capital  investment,  the  minimum  wage  is viewed  as an issue  affecting  their  ability  to 
compete  competitively.  It might  also  be inferred,  then,  that  those  representatives  in the  industrial 
sections  who  support  minimum  wage  increases  view  it as a measure  which,  in part,  will  stem  the 
flow  of capital  investment  -- ultimately  jobs  -- from  their  regions  to the  lower  wage  areas,  most 
notably  “right-to-work”  states.  If representatives  vote  in the  interests  of their  constituents,  they 
are clearly  doing  so in these  regions  of  the  country.  Moreover,  they  are voting  on  the  face  of 
those  interests  wielding  greater  power.  But  it also  isn’t  difficult  to see  how  the  minimum  wage 
has  become  an issue  wrapped  up  in the  more  traditional  competition  between  states  for  capital 
investment  (Eisinger,  1988). 
It is actually  understandable  why  Democrats  from  “right-to-work”  states  might  vote 
against  the  minimum  wage.  What  is more  peculiar  is that  there  are a handful  of  Republicans 
willing  to vote  for  it. And  while  union  density  is those  states  may  be higher  relative  to “right-to- 
work”  states,  it is still  considerably  low  relative  to the  overall  workforce.  Why,  then,  are they 
willing  to vote  for  the  wage?  One  reason  might  be the  obvious  moral  concern  of  fairness  -- that 
they  believe  that  raising  the  wage  of  those  at the  bottom  end  of  the  scale  is the  right  thing  to do. 
But  when  we  stop  to consider  that  increases  often  tend  to be limited,  one  then  has  to  wonder  why 
more  don’t  see  themselves  able  to do  the  right  thing.  The  fact  that  increases  have  been  so minimal 
31 may  lead  to yet  another  plausible  explanation.  That  increases  are so much  below  equilibrium 
wages  means  that  representatives  who  support  increases  can  effectively  lend  their  moral  support 
to an issue  without  having  to worry  that  it will  have  a serious  negative  effect  on  people.  Of 
course,  if it is true  that  there  is little  negative  effect,  why  is there  so much  opposition  to the 
concept?  The  only  explanation  that  can  be offered  is the  traditional  one  of  the  slippery  slope,  that 
once  government  intervenes  in one  area  there  is no  telling  how  far it may  go. 
Nevertheless,  the  trends  in voting  only  reinforce  the  notion  that  the  minimum  wage  is a 
political  issue.  From  a policy  stand  point,  it would  imply  that  because  conclusive  data  on  the 
effects  of minimum  wage  does  not  exist,  whether  the  wage  is raised  or remains  where  it is likely 
to  be a question  of  which  interest  is best  able  to persuade  policymakers.  In  the realm  of politics, 
then,  reasons  for  raising  the  minimum  wage  stand  on  an equal  footing  with  those  for  not  raising 
the  minimum  wage.  One  thing,  however,  would  appear  to be clear:  By  focusing  the  issue  on  the 
teenage  labor  market  and  denying  any  positive  potential  benefits  to poor  people  -- as though  it is 
an either/or  proposition  -- the  issue  of the  minimum  wage  has  effectively  been  removed  from  the 
labor  market  -- which  may  be viewed  as a positive  area  of policy  debate  -- and  lodged  with  those 
elements  who  have  attached  to them  social  stigma.  By  transforming  the  minimum  wage  into  a 
poverty  issue,  the political  imperative  for  action  has effectively  been  diminished.  The  question, 
however,  is whether  in the  absence  of union  power  to maintain  the  minimum  wage  as specifically 
a labor  issue,  it wasn’t  inevitable  that  it would  become  a poverty  issue  where  it has  effectively 
been  marginalized. 
The  debate,  then,  needs  to be refocused,  back  from  poverty  to a traditional  labor  market 
issue  -- perhaps  even  a labor-management  issue.  I am  not  suggesting  that  the  answer  necessarily 
32 lies  in  strengthening  labor  unions,  though  that  in and  of itself  wouldn’t  necessarily  be a bad  thing. 
But  the  answer  does  lie in returning  the  minimum  wage  to the  broader  spectrum  of issues  that 
usually  fall  under  the  rubric  of  labor  market  concerns.  This  would  further  serve  to demonstrate 
why  the  minimum  wage  affects  us  all; not just  a particular  segment  of  the  population  -- one  that 
lacks  serious  political  clout.  Moreover,  it would  force  managers  to explain  just  why  a high-wage 
strategy  -- though  clearly  in the  interests  of  most  -- wouldn’t  be in their  interests.  Politically,  it 
would  become  even  harder  for  managers  to make  their  case  for  a low-wage  economy. 
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